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the military can be scaled down. However, the conclusion is only supportable if the United States adopts a fundamental change in its national security policy I and raises the threshold for using the military.
The consequences of choosing to be less active with the military are dramatically different than before. A reduced reliance on the military is consistent with both domestic political realities and security concerns in the post-Cold War era. Certainly, the United States has a new freedom not to use its military unless vital interests are directly at stake; and significantly, those interests can be more narrowly defined.
During the Cold war period, the superpower struggle deteriorated to a zero sum contest in which every prospective gain for the Soviet bloc was perceived as a loss for the West.
The goal of the United States became absolute containment, 2 rather than a discriminate policy of engagement. 
LESS CONCENTRATION ON THE MILITARY
Decisions made at the close of this century could well define the next. The United States is turning from a perceived need to be militarily involved on a global basis to concentration on domestic matters. 14 The modern age of interdependent economies, instantaneous communications, and fast transportation dictates that the United States will remain actively engaged in an ever-shrinking world. However, while the United States will retain its keen interest in international affairs, the standard for using American military forces should be substantially modified.
As the world power structure moves through an epochal What bothered us during the Cold War was that every instance of the use of force by the United states was watched by our friends and our enemies to see whether we had our resolve. So if we went into an operation, and it didn't work, we couldn't back off because of the way it would be read in Moscow or Jerusalem or Taipei.
Once started, you had to at least commit yourself to seeing it through.
Maybe that's different now. Maybe you can use force, and if it doesn't work, the backing off hasn't got the same kind of international concern.
Maybe you can use force not to achieve something, but to punish people for doing something. 68
While military power must continue to be used with the greatest discretion, the consequences of unsuccessful military attempts have now changed.
Certainly, national leaders must be concerned with the image of the United States. But there is no rival superpower to capitalize on an American "failure."
The new approach to military policy calls for less intervention, not more. 69 When the costs of using military power become higher than the United States should rationally pay, the nation has the freedom to simply disengage.
THE CONTINUING NEED FOR A STRONG MILITARY
In the absence of a clear threat, 70 the need for a dominant military has been questioned. But when the United States has the obvious will and ability to successfully wage war, it is also best situated to deter war. 71 Somewhat paradoxically, many are unwilling to spend money for a continuing strong military precisely because of America's current military strength. It is well and good to be optimistic and hopeful, but those expectations must be balanced. The point has been made succinctly: "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. ''72
Leaders must be especially cautious as they seek the "peace dividend" and downsize the military to take advantage of today's improved security environment. They need to learn from earlier experiences. 73 Recall, for example, how poorly the nation was prepared to fight global war after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
In time, the largest force in the nation's history was built up and it defeated major enemies in both Europe and the Pacific.
Five years later, however, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States found it had demobilized too far and was able to just hang on in the early months of fighting against a secondrate opponent. 74 to countries that can adequately respond to the conventional threats they will likely face with their own defense resources.
It will, however, continue to be appropriate for this nation to provide sufficient assurances that will minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation among friendly nations. I12
The United States will need to retain a sufficient nuclear deterrent. Inventories of nuclear weapons are being reduced by i0. While few would claim any nostalgia for the Cold War, that era did at least provide a certain consistency of mission. President George Bush thus took a cautious approach to the ending of the Cold War.
His "first and strongest impulse was to fear a breakdown in the stability that had kept the peace during four decades of the Cold War."
Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching In Place:
The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York:
Simon, 1992) 187.
ii. "With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the old American compass no longer works.
As a result, both the 'realist' school of American foreign policy and the 'idealist' school seem to have lost their way." Thomas L. Friedman, "It's Harder Now to Figure  Out Compelling National Interests," New York Times 31 May 1992: E5.
12.
As one columnist asserts: "No longer are the Soviet Union and communism the driving force of American policy."
Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Detached From World Turbulence," Washington Post 19 Feb. 1993: A21.
13.
The issue of "strategic depth" is discussed in National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1993) 13:
During the global struggle of the Cold War, developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response.
Today, the United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine whether and how particular challenges threaten our interests.
A clear understanding of our interests and responsibilities along with the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining whether U.S. forces must be committed.
14.
After the 1992 presidential elections, the incoming Clinton administration pledged to "focus like a laser on the economy. 
22.
As military strength becomes less important in international relations, it is well to remember that:
. .
. while engaging Moscow in an expensive arms race, America has had to compete for world market shares against allies like Japan and Germany which have allocated smaller percentages of their national resources to the military, thus freeing capital, personnel, and R&D for commercial manufacture that has undermined parts of the American military base.
Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random, 1993) 293.
23.
The intricate relationships have been aptly described by one commentator in the following terms:
The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. 88.
Of course, the transition to a more complex power structure did not occur overnight.
One writer submits that it was during the decade of the 1960s that "the world had changed from a bipolar one to a multipolar one, with several seats of power emerging to challenge the American-Soviet hegemony." John R. Greene, The Limits of Power:
The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992) 79.
24.
For a discussion of the shift in measures of power from the traditional military gauges to "soft power" considerations, see Nye, Bound to Lead, especially ch. 6.
25.
It has been argued that the United States should be placed alone, a tier above any other world power, because only America has the "military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself."
Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70 (1991) 
33.
Economic as well as political realities are driving down the size, budgets, and capabilities of the American military--thereby limiting the nation's ability to respond.
34.
Even if the United States still possess the world's most powerful military after force reductions are completed, as the military becomes smaller it simply cannot meet all of the challenges of a larger force (i.e., a force built for one "Desert Storm sized" major regional contingency cannot be expected to simultaneously handle two major contingencies and two minor ones. See also Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era:
Four Illustrative Options," House Armed Services Committee, Washington, 25 Feb. 1992).
35.
"'Foreign policy,' wrote Walter Lippmann in 1943 in an oftquoted phrase, 'consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power.'" Samuel P. In his critique of Lippmann, Huntington concludes that "some gap between capabilities and commitments may be inevitable."
Huntington, "Lippmann Gap" 477.
36. "In the absence of established guideposts our policies will be determined by impulse and image." James Schlesinger, "Quest For a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 18.
37.
Then-Defense Secretary Weinberger acknowledged: "We can never afford to buy the capabilities sufficient to meet all of our commitments with one hundred percent confidence." Caspar W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs 64 (1986): 678.
38.
It has been argued that the original doctrine of containment was itself pragmatic.
Problems later arose because the founders of the Cold War policy "left a costly legacy for successors who were neither as pragmatic nor as flexible when it came to balancing commitments with resources. 
41.
A distinguished commentator who has long opposed the role of the United States as a "global interventionist power" writes that:
"Only through costly experience have we begun to recognize that, more often than not, intervention has been against our own best interests--and in many if not most cases, too, it has not served a useful purpose in the other countries involved." J. William Fulbright, The Price of Empire (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989) 153.
42.
Even though the United States maintained a powerful military through the Cold War period, the underlying priorities of the nation did not really change.
Any decision to intervene militarily must be clearly justified within the best interests of the nation.
As one author notes: "Since 1789 the president's responsibility has been to safeguard the well-being and security of the American people, not to reform the world."
William G. Hyland, "Foreign Policy:
The Agenda Is Easy," Washington Post 24 Jan. 1993:
C7.
In the post-Cold War era, those basic policy concerns must be remembered.
43.
Many Americans question, for example, why the United States should become actively involved in Bosnia when the Europeans have shown a reluctance to do so.
See "We Don't Want to Fight, and Heaven Help Us If We Do," The Economist 22 Aug. 1992: 35. In early 1993 the United States supported a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing enforcement of a ban against Serbia military flights over Bosnian territory.
However, it was reported that "a senior State Department official complain[ed]:
• Our British friends are wimping again.
So are the French--and it's their goddamned resolution.'" Russell Watson, "Where the World Can Draw the Line," Newsweek 4 Jan. 1993:
35.
44.
Vietnam became a quagmire for the United States because the military effort put into the war was not first matched with clear thinking on political goals.
Americans "set ourselves goals which [could] not be attained with the means we were willing to employ." Morgenthau 368.
45. "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."
Carl (1992): 469.
52.
Under the proposed approach to the use of American military forces, alliances (including current ones) which commit the United States to military involvements must be carefully reviewed.
53.
Consistent with a more pragmatic approach to national security strategy, it has been asserted that:
In a perilous strategic world, it is usually a mistake to consider foreign policy to be an activist instrument at all.
Rather, Americans should start thinking of foreign policy in terms of avoiding problems, reducing vulnerabilities and costs, maximizing options, buying time, and muddling through--objectives that may be uninspiring but that are well suited to a strong, wealthy, geographically isolated country.
Tonelson 42.
54.
Reflecting on the current situation in the Balkans, one observer submits:
"What we are seeing now in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union may be the beginning of the wars of the communist succession." Robert Rudney, "Europe: Integration or Fragmentation?"
Armed Forces Journal International (Feb. 1993): 13.
55.
One of the primary "buffers," of course, was the Soviet military, which buttressed the Soviet policy of intervention in satellite nations (e.g., Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968).
56.
On this point, it has been argued that "ethnic conflicts once suppressed during the Cold War are creating a type of war for which we are poorly prepared." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Self-Determination Trap," Washington Post 15 Dec. 1992: A23. 34 57.
A foreign policy expert suggests that:
To quote Winston Churchill, "the war of the giants" has been followed by the "war of the pygmies"--but their wars will not be easily ignored.
At the end of the twentieth century, even weak and underdeveloped states are arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction.
Their conflicts will be very destabilizing and will touch directly the interests and security of the United States, not least through the threats they pose to U.S. friends and allies .... Robert G. Neumann, "The Next Disorderly Half Century: Some Proposed Remedies," Washington Quarterly 16.1 (1993): 44.
58.
It is recognized, of course, that many nations are displeased with their boundaries and are not willing to forego the military option to effect changes.
59.
Consider the situation in Cyprus, for example. No real, final solution to that island's problems has been reached, but violence has been minimized.
Many nations have helped to manage the problem while a real "solution" has been deferred.
See 
60.
Some 218 instances in which the United States "used its armed forces as a political instrument" in a 30-year period 
61.
For example, nations in the region or those with former colonial ties will often have more at stake than the United States.
62.
This general observation has been made:
In the democratic parts of the world, it is much harder than it used to be for governments to put their soldiers in harm's way.
To do so, they need either a clear threat to national security or, as America judged in Somalia, at least the prospect that a lot of good can be done at minimal risk to The Economist 30 Jan. 1993: 15.
63.
The absence of a hegemonic threat to the United States has been described as:
truly a watershed event, and it should fundamentally change how we view regional or internecine conflicts.
In most cases such disorders will not impinge on vital U.S. security interests.
Washington can, therefore, afford to view them with detachment, intervening only as a balancer of last resort when a conflict cannot be contained by other powers in the affected region and is expanding to the point where America's security is threatened. Act, October 23, 1983 , 20 Dec. 1983 3. "Unfortunately, in a surprisingly short time, the Americans gave up their impartiality by supporting" forces of the Lebanese government The Korean War, 1950 -1953 (Boston: Little, 1990 To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends." Cheney 7. A columnist adds: "Today the nation is more physically secure from foreign attack than at any time in its 216 years." George F. Will, "A Continental Shrug,"
Washington Post 5 Nov. 1992: A23.
79.
As expressed by one scholar:
From the second decade of the nineteenth century to the fourth decade of the twentieth century, Americans had little cause to worry about their security. Security was a given fact of nature and circumstance, an inheritance rather than a creation .... One of the more basic and obvious facts of our time is that changes in technology and international politics have combined to make security now the final goal of policy rather than its starting assumption. 
83.
It is also worth considering whether the American public will tolerate substantial casualties except for the unambiguous defense of the highest priority national interests, such as defense of the homeland.
84.
The distinction between coalition warfare and collective security must be understood.
Simply stated, collective security arrangements are formalized and enduring, while coalitions "are for the most part ad hoc arrangements designed to respond to a rapidly emerging crisis when no formal security arrangement exists." Don M. Snider and Gregory Grant, " Praeger, 1991).
92.
Discussing the endurance of alliances during the Cold War period, one expert says:
"alliances, in the end, are the product of insecurity; so long as the soviet Union and the United States each remain [ed] for the other and for their respective clients the major source of danger in the world, neither super-power encounter[ed] very much difficulty in maintaining the coalitions it control [led] ."
Gaddis, Long Peace 222.
93.
It has been suggested that "the United States is considerably less likely to dispatch forces abroad in the postCold War era.
In this sense the gulf crisis belongs to the past, not the future, of American foreign policy."
Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 69 (1990): 12.
94.
One commentator cautions against drawing erroneous conclusions because of "the many special circumstances that make the Gulf War an unlikely model for future collective responses." Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): 7.
95.
See, e.g., George Bush, "Why We Are In the Gulf," Newsweek 26 Nov. 1990: 28-29; George J. Church, "Raising the Ante," Time 19 Nov. 1990: 48.
96.
Of course, it may be argued that the United States does have a vital interest in preventing a general or major land war in Europe.
Insofar as the situation in the former Yugoslavia may expand in that manner, the United States would have an interest in joining other nations in an intervention.
See Flora Lewis, "From Paranoia to Peril," New York Times 20 Mar. 1993:
A21 ("The Clinton administration has determined that the war in the former Yugoslavia is a 'strategic interest' of the U.S. because of the implications of a widening conflict.").
97.
See, e.g., Stephen S. The Economist 30 Jan.
1993 : 15.
103.
It may be noted, however, that a smaller military can perhaps cause political leaders to be more reluctant to get involved when less that vital interests are at risk, simply because less of the military asset will be available for any purpose.
104.
One author submits the United States would have a prohibitive advantage in such battles because of America's advanced weapons systems:
Almost unnoticed, the technology that drives the science of war has taken a giant leap forward, and the Third World has been left behind.
In any conventional conflict in which the United States or any of the major Western powers is pitted against a Third World adversary, the outcome is preordained. In effect, the change is so significant that we have returned to the military equation of the 19th century, when colonial wars pitted small numbers of disciplined, well-trained Western troops with rifles against hordes of tribal warriors armed with only shields and spears. 
106.
When your opponent is substantially less well armed than you, your need to work on the "next generation" weapons system is diminished.
Of course, American leaders cannot assume that today's well armed allies will remain amicable.
Efforts to modernize weapons systems must therefore continue, even if the pace can be scaled down from the Cold War effort.
107.
Cheney 11-18.
108.
The reduced presence of American forces overseas should not be viewed as a solution to domestic economic problems.
"Defense savings do not translate directly unto cures for domestic ills; reducing defense spending and foreign aid should not be mistaken as a strategy for solving America's internal problems." Stephen W. Bosworth, "The United States and Asia," Foreign Affairs 71 (1992):
128.
109.
The Japanese government, for example, agreed in January 1991 to pay approximately three-quarters of the costs associated with stationing United States forces in Japan (exclusive of U.S. military and Defense Department civilian personnel costs).
In
